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1. Introduction
How does the generosity of a person depend on that person's sex, and on the sex of the
person who is the target of the generous act? How do the answers to this question
depend on the degree of anonymity between the parties? We provide answers based
on an experiment.
Our approach relies on the dictator game, a popular tool in experimental
research introduced by Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin & Sefton (1994), and possibly the
simplest vehicle for investigating generosity: One person (the dictator) divides a sum
of money between her-/himself and another person (the recipient), and payments are
made accordingly. In our design, the dictator is informed about the sex of the recipient
via the wording of the instructions, and we observe the sex of the dictator. We
furthermore manipulate the degree of anonymity between the subjects, by varying the
circumstances under which payments are made. In the treatment with private payment
(PP), the instructions explained that the subjects could pick up their payments without
directly identifying themselves to other participants in the experiment. In the
alternative treatment with on stage payment ( OS), the instructions explained that
dictators would receive their payments in a lecture hall with a few hundred co-
students present (clapping and cheering, as it turned out and could reasonably have
been expected).
Hence, in total we have 2×2×2=8 categories of observations that can be
classified in terms of three treatment variables: the sex of the dictator, the sex of the
recipient, and the payment condition. The motivation for the first two treatment
variables is obvious in a study of discrimination, while the last one is included to shed
some light on the possible importance of the social setting for understanding
discriminatory behavior. We shall investigate the importance of each of these three2
treatment variables systematically, and compare our findings with the following three
important sets of results that have previously been documented.
Discrimination
Fershtman & Gneezy (2001) and Holm (2000) pioneered the approach of examining
discrimination in the lab by informing subjects of certain co-player characteristics.
Our design is most closely related to Fershtman & Gneezy's. They study
discrimination by ethnicity and gender in several games, within a subject pool of
Israeli Jewish students. They report evidence on male discrimination by ethnicity. The
one game in which discrimination does not occur is the dictator game (a finding
which prompts the conclusion that discrimination is determined by ethnic stereotypes,
rather than by "taste" as in Becker (1957)). We shall examine whether also in our
setting (with Swedish instead of Israeli Jewish students, and without differential
information about ethnicity) discrimination does not occur in a dictator game. If we
do find evidence of discrimination, we wish to know whether it is a predominantly
male or female phenomenon.
Are women less selfish than men?
A great many researchers in different fields have grappled with this issue, but there is
no general consensus. Eckel & Grossman (1998) cite some of this evidence and note
that a variety of confounding factors contaminate comparisons between the different
studies. They conduct a dictator game experiment, related to the study by Bolton &
Katok (1995) but intended to eliminate all factors other than gender-related
differences in selfishness that might influence results. Their design is "double-blind";3
the subjects were anonymous both towards one another and to the experimenter.
Eckel & Grossman state (pp. 732-3):
Our results indicate that women are less selfish than men when confounding
factors are eliminated…. Having established this baseline difference in men
and women, it is appropriate now for research to address the issue of how
other parameters of the experimental setting influence the behaviour of men
and women.
This is where we pick up, adding the aspects of discrimination and anonymity to
Eckel & Grossman's gender-and-generosity perspective. We ask if Eckel &
Grossman's results are robust with respect to these changes. We also make a
comparison with the results of Andreoni & Vesterlund (2001), who study a dictator
game where the pie shares differ in value to the two players. They find some support
for the female generosity effect, and that women are more likely than men to be
"equalitarians" choosing a division that gives equal payoffs.
Social distance
This term is defined by the Encyclopedia of Psychology (2000) as "the perceived
distance between individuals or groups". The concept has a long history in social
science research. Bogardus (1928) developed a scale to measure it based on
statements such as "I would marry this person" and "I would have this person
excluded from the country", which suggests that he had a rather multi-faceted notion
in mind. When economists have picked up on the concept, they have focused on one
particular aspect: anonymity. Two influential studies are Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat
& Smith (1994) and Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith (1996), who investigate how the
social distance, represented as the degree of anonymity between the subjects and the
experimenter, affects the amount of money donated in dictator games. They find that
selfishness increases with social distance, a finding which has inspired or spawned4
several other studies.
1 We will connect to this issue, although our treatments involve
considerably less anonymity than any of Hoffman et al's. In the light of their result it
would be natural to expect dictators to donate more money in the OS case than in the
PP case. We shall investigate whether this is so, and thus whether the predicted
relation between social distance and selfishness extends to a context where the social
distance is relatively small.
The paper is structured as follows: The details of the experimental procedure are
spelled out in Section 2. In section 3 we report the experimental results, focusing on
the impact of each of our three treatment variables (dictator's sex, recipient's sex, PP
vs OS condition). In Section 4 we discuss the three issues of discrimination,
selfishness and social distance. In that section we also examine how the constitution
of our subject pool (students in economics and business) may have influenced the
results. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
2. The procedure
The experiment was carried out in the spring of 2000 at Stockholm University. The
subject pool consisted of 388 students, which is an unusually large number for
experiments of this kind. All subjects were enrolled in the introductory
microeconomics course, which involved ten auditorium lectures (to which all students
were invited) and five seminars run by teaching assistants. For the seminars, the
students were split into smaller groups of 20-30 students. The experiment was carried
out in connection with these seminars. We asked the teaching assistants to distribute a
                                               
1 See Bohnet & Frey (1999a and 1999b), Bolton, Katok & Zwick (1998), Charness & Gneezy (2000),
Frolich, Oppenheimer & Kurki (2001), Frolich, Oppenheimer & Moore (2000), and Johannesson &
Persson (2000).5
one-page instruction sheet (see the Appendix) to each student present. Every student
in a seminar group got instructions with the same wording, and hence were part of the
same treatment. Teaching assistants were asked to give no information about the
experiment, other than that participation was voluntary.
The instruction sheet (see the appendix) informed the student that participation
meant stating a "code number" (see below), and answering a question concerning how
to divide 1000 Swedish kronor (≈$110 at the time of the experiment) between the
student her/himself and another student in the course. That other student was referred
to in one of two different ways:
•  as a randomly selected female student in the course, or
•  as a randomly selected male student in the course.
In this way dictators were informed about the sex of the recipient. Note that unlike
Holm (2000), Fershtman & Gneezy (2001), and Charness & Gneezy (2000), we did
not use names as signals. Names may convey other information than sex, such as
ethnicity (Fershtman & Gneezy), or may avoid disclosing sex if only a family name is
given (Charness & Gneezy). In our design nothing other than sex is signaled.
In order to participate, a student had to specify a "code number", consisting of
the student's initials plus the last four digits of her/his social security number. Swedish
social security numbers have ten digits, specifying year-month-day of birth plus four
digits where the penultimate one is even for a woman and odd for a man. Our design
makes crucial use of this last feature. It allows us to separate the data according to the
dictator's sex.
2 The code numbers do not automatically reveal a subject's identity,
                                               
2 For example, the Swedish social security number of one of the authors of this paper is 640421-2034.
Exercise: Try to figure out which one!6
although, with some effort, one might be able to figure out someone's identity, given
her/his initials plus last four digits.
The instructions furthermore stated that one of the participants in the
experiment would be selected at random, and payments would be made to that
student/dictator and the recipient with whom she/he was matched, the amounts each
received being determined by the dictator's decision.
3  The selection was to be made
at an auditorium lecture (one of those to which all students were invited) 10 days
later.
The instructions went on to describe what dictators (if selected) would have to
do in order to get paid. One of the following two possibilities applied:
•  to pick up their payments in private, by showing up at our offices some time
during the next few weeks, or
•  to identify themselves during an auditorium lecture, and to come on stage to get
paid (the amount being announced, a few hundred people watching).
These alternatives define the PP (private payment) and OS (on stage) controls.
Payments to recipients were always made anonymously, i.e. according to the first of
these conditions.
Note that our design generates the eight types of observations discussed in the
introduction, depending on the sex of the dictator, the sex of the recipient, and the
payment condition (PP versus OS). Since the sex of the dictator is observed via the
code numbers, only the sex of the recipient and the social distance condition needed
to be indicated via the wording of the instructions. Hence, we had altogether four
different wordings of the instructions.
                                               
3 We paid 1000 kronor to one pair of students for each wording of the instructions and we had between
73 and 94 participants for each wording. We did not mention this in the instructions since we did not
indicate that different treatments were included in the experiment.7
3. Results
3.1 Participation rates
32 out of 388 students chose not to participate (i.e., they chose not to specify code
numbers and decide how to split 1000 kronor). The remaining 356 students chose to
take active part in the experiment, by specifying code numbers and deciding on how
to split 1000 kronor. In three out of these 356 cases the code number did not
correspond to the four-digit standard and in one case it was illegible. These four
particular answers are not included at all in our data analysis, so our analysis will
count 352 participating students.
Note that the non-participating students make up "observations" too; the
decision not to participate is in itself an interesting one. The participation rate varied
according to treatment. TABLE 1 displays, for each of our eight cells, the number of
students who actively chose to participate in the experiment, and the number of
students who chose not to participate.
PRIVATE PAYMENT (PP) ON STAGE PAYMENT (OS)
TO FEMALE TO MALE TO FEMALE TO MALE
FROM FEMALE 54 / 1 26 / 2 43 / 9 47 / 1
FROM MALE 38 / 3 47 / 3 51 / 11 46 / 2
TABLE 1: Number of participants/non-participants for each type of observation
Is the participation rate different under different treatments? TABLE  1  gives the
answer. Visual inspection indicates that the participation rates split into two
categories; the rate is considerably lower in the two cells with on stage payment and a
female recipient. Note that it takes both the OS payment condition and a female8
recipient for participation rates to go down. The difference is confirmed by a chi-
square test, which rejects the hypothesis that the participation rates are the same when
either of the two cells with female recipient and on stage payment is compared with
any of the other cells.
4
3.2 Donated amounts
FIGURE 1 conveys a first impression of the overall structure of the data, indicating the
frequencies with which different amounts {0-50, 51-100, ..., 951-1000} were donated.
Looking at the whole sample of participating subjects, the average amount donated
was 275 kronor, which is reasonably consistent with previous findings.
5 The amounts
donated are concentrated around 0 kronor and 500 kronor.
[Fig. 1 about here]
We now focus on three questions:
(i) Do men and women receive different amounts?
(ii) Do men and women donate different amounts?
(iii) Does the payment condition matter?
In order to provide answers, we study how the amount of money donated varies with
the sex of the dictator, the sex of the recipient, and whether or not the subjects had to
go on stage in order to get paid.
                                               
4 P<0.05 for each of these comparisons.
5 Compare the previously cited papers, or the results surveyed by Roth (1995). In our data, equal splits
are somewhat more frequent than in most other studies (Section 4.2 gives exact numbers).9
TABLE 2 below displays means (and medians) of amounts donated for the
eight cells. Visual inspection suggests some systematic patterns in the data. More
money seems to be donated to women, particularly when the dictator is a man.
Furthermore, and to our great surprise, dictators seem overall to donate less money in
the OS treatment than in the PP treatment.
PRIVATE PAYMENT ON STAGE PAYMENT
TO FEMALE TO MALE TO FEMALE TO MALE
FROM FEMALE 334  (425) 323  (400) 264  (250) 226 (200)
FROM MALE 352  (499) 276  (223) 269  (139) 180  (5.5)
TABLE 2: Means (medians) donated
We shall analyze whether our different treatment variables induce differences in
behavior if we consider all the data, splitting the whole data set into two parts
according to which treatment variable is in focus. FIGURE 2 shows the difference in
means for each of the three treatment variables, taken one at a time.
[Fig. 2 about here]
We now turn to formal statistical tests to determine whether or not the observed
differences are significant. Since the distribution of donations is non-normal, we use
non-parametric methods (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney).
6 We first ask if men and women
                                               
6 In the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test the data is ranked and the test assumes a continuous distribution,
where the probability of a tie is zero. When ties occur, as in our data, average ranks are assigned to tied
data and the test statistic is calculated accordingly. The effect of correcting for ties is small (see Siegel
& Castellan (1988 pp. 134-136)).10
receive different amounts. In that case we would expect to reject the following
hypothesis:
H1: Female and male recipients receive the same donations.
A two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of the null hypothesis that the
two samples are from the same distribution rejects H1 (P = 0.01) in a two-tailed test.
The difference in means and medians indicates that female recipients receive larger
donations than male ones.
Next, we ask if men and women differ in their behavior. In that case we would
expect to reject the following hypothesis:
H2: Female and male dictators make the same donations.
Although (as seen in FIGURE  2) on average women give more than men, this
difference is not significant. H2 is not rejected at conventional levels of significance
(P = 0.16).
Finally, we ask if social distance matters, in the sense that behavior differs
between the PP and OS treatments. In that case we would expect to reject the
following hypothesis:
H3: The same donations are made in the PP and OS treatments.11
H3 is rejected (P = 0.001). We conclude that larger donations are made in the PP
case.
7
3.3 The proportions who give nothing
It turns out that our data can be usefully analyzed from a different perspective, by
focusing on the proportions of persons who give nothing to the recipient. To see this,
it is instructive to first note that if we restrict attention to the 269 out of 352 data
points involving non-zero donations, then the differences in behavior (as recorded in
Section 3.2) become less conspicuous. TABLE 3 and FIGURE 3, which are derived just
like TABLE 2 and FIGURE 2 except that zero donations are excluded, are suggestive of
this. The treatment effects on mean donations are smaller when zero donations are
excluded.
PRIVATE PAYMENT ON STAGE PAYMENT
TO FEMALE TO MALE TO FEMALE TO MALE
FROM FEMALE 347  (455) 400 (500) 334  (400) 322  (400)
FROM MALE 418  (500) 382  (500) 415  (500) 276  (275)
TABLE 3: Means (medians) of positive (>0) donations
More precisely, when we perform analogous tests based on the new dataset created by
dropping the zero donations from the original set, none of the hypotheses H1, H2, and
                                               
7 The conclusions drawn in this section are supported in that an alternative and often used approach to
analyzing data, the (parametric) analysis of variance (ANOVA), gives the same results as the
nonparametric tests we have used. Using ANOVA, the effects of "Female recipient" and "OS payment"
are significant (P=0.03 and P=0.002 respectively); the effect of  "Female dictator" is not (P=0.57).12
H3 can be rejected.
8 Thus for the censored data set, we cannot reject the hypotheses
that there are no differences between treatment groups.
[Fig. 3 about here]
Given this finding, it seems natural to categorize the data according to whether or not
the dictator gave nothing to the recipient. Using this categorization we create a new
variable, "the percentage who give nothing", which is now our dependent variable.
TABLE  4 shows these percentages for the eight treatment groups, and FIGURE  4
presents these percentages according to treatment variable.
PRIVATE PAYMENT ON STAGE PAYMENT
TO FEMALE TO MALE TO FEMALE TO MALE
FROM FEMALE   4% 19% 21% 30%
FROM MALE 16% 28% 35% 35%
TABLE 4: Proportion of subjects who give nothing
The tendencies observed in TABLE 4 and FIGURE 4 are reminiscent of the tendencies
regarding the amounts donated for the full dataset (cf. TABLE 2, FIGURE 2). In order to
test this statistically, we investigate three hypotheses which are motivated just like H1,
                                               
8 The significance levels for the associated Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests are P=0.21 for H1, P=0.43
for H2, and P=0.17 for H3. The donations in the dataset are roughly symmetric around the equal split
(cf. FIGURE 1). The hypothesis that these donations are normally distributed cannot be rejected, so we
have a choice between non-parametric methods and the parametric analysis of variance (ANOVA). The
choice does not matter; ANOVA tests confirm the non-significance result (P=0.23, P=0.22, and P=0.14
for the three variables "Female donator" "Female recipient", and "On stage payment").13
H2, and H3, except that we focus on the proportion who give nothing rather than the
amount donated.
[Fig. 4 about here]
The first question is whether the frequency of zero donations differs according to the
recipient's sex. In that case we would expect to reject the following hypothesis:
H1*: Female and male recipients receive nothing equally often.
A chi-square test for two independent samples rejects H1* (P=0.03) in a two-tailed
test. This confirms the robustness of the pattern displayed in TABLE 4, namely, that
more men than women receive donations of zero.
The second question is whether men and women differ in their behavior. If
they do we should expect to reject the following hypothesis:
H2*: Female and male dictators give nothing equally often.
H2* is rejected (P=0.01). We conclude that more men than women give nothing. The
finding can be compared with our earlier finding (in Section 3.2) of no significant
gender difference in amounts donated.
The third question we consider is whether social distance matters, in the sense
that behavior differs between the PP and OS treatments. In that case we expect to be
able to reject the following hypothesis:14
H3*: Nothing is given equally often in the PP and OS treatments.
H3* is rejected (P=0.001). This corroborates the previous conclusion that people are
less inclined to give when they know that their behaviour will become public
knowledge.
9
4. Discussion
In this section we discuss our results from the viewpoints of discrimination (4.1),
selfishness (4.2), and social distance (4.3), connecting to key findings in the studies
by Fershtman & Gneezy, Eckel & Grossman, and Hoffman et al, and some related
work. We also discuss some aspects concerning the constitution of our subject pool
that have relevance for the interpretation of our results (4.4).
4.1 Is there discrimination?
In our study we find that there is discrimination by gender in that women receive
higher donations than men do. In the literature on discrimination in labor markets (see
e.g. Altonji & Blank, 1999) gender-based discrimination is always perceived as
leading to women receiving less  (i.e. a lower wage) than men. In relation to this
empirical conclusion, the phenomenon that we observe might be termed "reverse"
discrimination.
Our result agrees with Fershtman & Gneezy in that we found discrimination,
but differs from theirs in that we found it in a dictator game, a game in which they did
                                               
9 Using logistic regression we found that also taken simultaneously each of the three treatment
variables have a significant effect on the decision to donate (P=0.01, P=0.05 and P=0.001 for the three
variables "Female donator" "Female recipient" and "On-stage payment"). The direction of the effect is
positive for "Female donator" and  Female recipient" and negative for "On-stage payment". The results
are thus confirmed.15
not observe discrimination. Fershtman & Gneezy argue that the discrimination found
in a dictator game would be caused by a taste for discrimination, since it is not due to
any (correct or incorrect) beliefs about the recipient's attitudes. This argument
suggests that the subjects in our study may have a taste for discrimination.
The experimental literature on gender differences suggests some possible
explanations. First, the dictator game can be seen as a "charity game". If charitable
donations reflect the perceived needs of recipients, and if it is felt that women earn
less income and own less wealth than men, then women's needs may appear greater
than men's needs, and women would receive more. This explanation appears
consistent with some of the results of Holm & Engseld (2001), who examine a
dictator game where the dictator knew the gender and income of the recipient. They
find that low-income women receive considerably higher donations than high-income
men. However, this explanation appears somewhat contrived in our context; the
students in the microeconomics class at Stockholm University probably all have about
the same incomes, irrespective of sex.
An alternative explanation for the result relies on a combination of two
different effects found by Eckel & Grossman (2001) in an ultimatum game. They
label these effects chivalrymen are more generous to women than to men, and
solidaritywomen are more generous to women. These two effects combined could
produce our result where both men and women donate more to women than to men.
In Fershtman & Gneezy's study, outside the dictator game, discrimination is a
predominantly male phenomenon. In our experiment, the pattern of mean amounts
donated in the eight groups may seem to conform rather well with this pattern.
However, one-to-one comparisons between the eight cells do not show significant
differences.16
4.2 Are women less selfish than men?
Eckel & Grossman find that women's donations are significantly higher than men's
donations. In our study, although average donations from women are higher than
those from men, the difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand, when
looking at the proportions of men and women who give nothing we do find that
significantly more men do so.
Our design differentiates between two different  gender-based generosity
effects. First, there is the effect of the gender of the dictator. Second, there is the
effect of the gender of the recipient. Each of these effects could give rise to a
difference between how much men receive from men and how much women receive
from women. Eckel & Grossman focus on the generosity of different donators (i.e. the
first effect) and do not disclose any information about the sex of the recipient. To
ensure subject anonymity with respect to the experimenter, while yet allowing for
observation of the dictators' sex, they have separate sessions for female and male
dictators.
In view of our finding that subjects are more generous to females, the question
arises whether Eckel & Grossman's subjects could have made some (tacit) assumption
about the sex of their recipients based on the sex of themselves and the other subjects
in their session. Could it be that the women subjects thought that their recipients were
female and the men subjects that their recipients were male? In that case, the recipient
gender effect that we have found (i.e. that subjects are more generous to women)
would have strengthened Eckel & Grossman's result (that women are more generous).
This could explain why the female generosity effect is somewhat weaker in our
design.17
Andreoni & Vesterlund (2001) study gender and generosity in a modified
dictator game, where the size of the pie is dependent on how much the dictator
donates. In their experiment, the relative price of one monetary unit donated varies
(between one third and three), and so does the initial size of the pie. We can compare
our results with their two cases (differing in initial pie size) with a relative price of
one. There they find that women on average give more than men, but the difference is
significant in only one of the two cases, a result which is consistent with our
somewhat weak female generosity effect.
Another interesting effect found by Andreoni & Vesterlund is that women are
more likely than men to be "equalitarians", i.e. to choose a division that gives equal
payoffs, while men are more likely to either give nothing or to choose the division
that leads to the maximum size of the pie. We too find that men are more likely than
women to be give nothing. The effect of the size of the pie cannot be tested in our
data, but we can check for a gender difference in the proportion of subjects who
donate exactly 500 kronor. Overall in our data, 33 percent act as equalitarians in this
sense. The proportion of equalitarians among the men is lower than that among the
women, 30 percent compared with 37 percent, but the difference is not significant
(P=0.14 in a two-tailed test).
4.3 How does social distance matter?
Hoffman et al  (1994, 1996) conjecture that social distance may influence the subjects'
motivation. They report results from dictator game experiments in which the social
distance is varied by varying the conditions of anonymity/privacy under which the
subjects decide on the size of donations. The main finding is that selfishness increases18
with anonymity. Bohnet & Frey (1999a) and Charness & Gneezy (2000) report results
which point in the same direction.
Both the PP and the OS treatments in our study involve far less anonymity
than any of Hoffman et al's. The OS treatment at least seems to involve less
anonymity than any treatment of Bohnet & Frey and Charness & Gneezy. Yet, in the
light of these authors' findings, it would be natural to expect dictators to donate more
money in the OS case than in the PP case. A recent study by Rege & Telle (2001)
may seem to fuel this expectation further, although they study a different game. In a
public goods experiment, they find that subjects increase their contributions if their
identity and contribution are revealed. Against this background, we were surprised to
find that our results go in the opposite direction.
This suggests to us that the notion of social distance is multi-faceted (as early
researchers like Bogardus (1928) seemed to assume). For researchers looking for the
"right" model of subject  preferences it would be rather convenient to simply include
in the utility an additively separable and linear argument measuring social distance.
Our result suggests that this route is blocked, or at least that anonymity (among
subjects or between subject and experimenter) can not be accepted as an unambiguous
proxy for social distance.
Other recent results support the hypothesis that it may be problematic to
conceive of anonymity as a useful way to manipulate social distance. Frolich,
Oppenheimer & Moore (2000) report that as anonymity is increased in dictator
games, subjects in the dictator position may start disbelieving the very existence of a
recipient. This is a problem, since however the concept of social distance is defined
there must surely be at least one other person involved. Frolich, Oppenheimer &
Kurki (2001) report evidence suggesting other ways in which changes in design breed19
doubts in the minds of subjects about the details of the experimental context. One
interpretation of all this is that as anonymity is manipulated, other considerations that
may affect social distance tend to change alongside. A similar mechanism may well
be at work in our design; going on stage in the OS treatment may involve a whole
new array of considerations, for example whether a dictator suffers from stage fright
or is an exhibitionist, on top of the reduction of anonymity.
We suspect that similar concerns may also influence the results of other
experimental studies on the importance of social distance.  For example, in the recent
dictator game study by Johannesson & Persson (2000) the authors replicate Hoffman
et al's treatment with the highest social distance treatment, with the subjects being
students at the Stockholm School of Economics. This treatment is compared with a
control in which the recipients are randomly selected persons from the Swedish
population, to whom donations are sent by mail. Johannesson & Persson suggest that
since the interacting subjects are no longer students at the same university, this
"removes any possible remaining reciprocity" in the design. Thus, they attempt to
maximize the social distance. We find it reasonable to suspect, however, that
Johannesson & Persson's imaginative design introduces a completely new aspect in
the minds of the dictators. They may feel intrigued by the thought of the recipient
opening a letter to find a lot, or a little, money from the Stockholm School of
Economics (no letter was sent if no money was donated). Such a recipient is likely to
be quite surprised and will possibly react quite differently from a student who has
chosen to participate under the benchmark design, and this in itself may influence the
dictators' decisions.20
4.4 The subject pool
How general are our results on discrimination, gender and social distance? The
natural place to start such a discussion is to consider whether our results could be
dependent on our choice of subjects, which was a class of introductory economics
students at Stockholm University.
There is a literature on the influence on behaviour of studying economics,
focusing on effects on cooperativeness. The evidence is mixed. In both questionnaire
data and in a prisoner's dilemma game Frank, Gilovich & Regan (1993, 1996) find
that studying economics has detrimental effects on cooperativeness. Yezer, Goldfarb
& Poppen (1996) expose this hypothesis to a "lost letter" experiment and find that
economics students are considerably more likely than others to return ten dollars
anonymously. This result is contradicted by Frank & Schultze (2000) who find that
economics students are more corrupt than others.
A recent study by Frey & Meier (2000) offers a more refined perspective, to
which our results can be linked. Our subject group of introductory economics students
actually consisted of two sub-groups, business students on the one hand and students
who take economics as part of a non-business degree on the other.
10 Frey & Meier
finds significant differences in behaviour between two similar groups, classified as
"political economists" and "business students". They investigate historical data on
actual donations of all students at the University of Zürich during three academic
years. One of their results is that business students donate considerably less than
political economists.
We have checked whether our results conform with Frey & Meier's finding.
TABLE 5 shows the data from our experiment on how the numbers of subjects in each21
treatment group are divided between business students and non-business students.
(These numbers add upp to the participating number in each group in TABLE 1.)
PRIVATE PAYMENT (PP) ON STAGE PAYMENT (OS)
TO FEMALE TO MALE TO FEMALE TO MALE
FROM FEMALE 16 / 38 18 / 8 16 / 27 22 / 25
FROM MALE 17 / 21 28 / 19 17 / 34 17 / 29
TABLE 5: Number of participating students (business/non-business) for each cell
If the business/non-business variable has a significant effect on the amount donated or
on the proportion that donates, we should be able to reject one or both of the
following hypotheses:
H4: The two student categories make the same donations.
H4*: The two student categories give nothing equally often.
Neither H4 nor H4* is rejected (P=0.46 for H4 and P=0.68 for H4*). However, two
sub-group differences emerge: First, if we consider only donations to males, business
students give significantly less than non-business students.
11 Second, looking at non-
business students alone, donations under the OS treatment are significantly lower than
in the PP treatment, while within the business students sub-group that difference is
                                                                                                                                      
10 These student groups were separated into different seminar groups which makes it possible to
distinguish between them in the data.
11 The mean donation to men from non-business students is 296 kronor and from business students 186
kronor, with P=0.0006 in a Whitney-Mann-Wilcoxon test.22
smaller (comparing means) and not significant.
12 These differences suggest that the
magnitude of some of our results on discrimination, gender and social distance may
vary between business and non-business student groups. Note however that the
direction of our results remains the same.
5. Concluding remark
Most of economic theory presumes that decision makers are rational and selfish.
Evidence from many sources—experiments, interviews, field studies, introspection—
indicates that this picture is in serious need of revision. Economists are increasingly
calling for more research aimed at revealing what sociological or psychological
features are important determinants of economic decision making, and for the
incorporation of these concerns into economic theory.
13 We provide some empirical
input to this process. Our ex ante aim was to shed light on gender differences in
selfishness and discriminatory behavior; in retrospect, the results also raise some
doubts concerning the merits of organizing experimental findings in terms of social
distance.
Our results on discrimination may seem somewhat surprising, as they involve
more favorable treatment of women than of men. Many economic studies have
suggested the opposite pattern. It is probably a good idea to be cautious in drawing
far-reaching conclusions from this result. The dictator game setting we have studied is
rather special and not necessarily relevant to understanding discrimination in the
marketplace. Still, a word of caution may be conferred also to those who believe that
                                               
12 The mean donation from non-business students in the OS treatment is 214 kronor and in the PP
treatment 351 kronor, with P=0.0004. The mean donation from business students is 248 kronor in the
OS treatment and 291 kronor in the PP treatment, with P=0.17.
13 See, for example, Rabin (1998) and Fehr & Falk (2001).23
women are always discriminated against. At the very least, we have provided an
example where this is not the case.
We have also discussed how our results shed some light on gender related
differences in selfishness, and the (complicated) effects related to manipulation of the
degree of anonymity between subjects. It is interesting to relate all these findings to
the recent work on "social preferences", which attempts to find out how to best
represent the preferences of economic agents when they are not completely selfish
(see Fehr & Schmidt 2001 and Sobel 2001 for surveys). It is noteworthy that the
models in this literature fall short of capturing the effects we have found. Consider,
for example, the models of Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr & Schmidt (1999),
according to which decision makers are averse to unequal payoff distributions.
14
While their model allows inequity aversion to vary in strength from one decision
maker to another, it makes reference neither to the sex of various players nor to the
degree of anonymity between them.
Consider, furthermore, the following: We have found that when explaining the
 variation in how much money is donated by dictators, an important feature that is
affected by all three treatment variables is how frequently nothing is given (cf.
Section 3.2). The size of the positive donations, on the other hand, is not affected by
the treatment variables. One interpretation of this pattern is that a dictator's decision is
made in two stages: the first decision is whether or not to donate, the second decision
determines the exact amount, and the influence of the treatment variables on this
process goes mainly via the first stage. If this pattern is valid for our dictator game, a
similar two-step mental procedure is perhaps also valid for other games. However, the
                                               
14 See Engelmann & Strobel (2001) for a recent experimental investigation of these and some other
models.24
models of social preferences that exist do not seem to take into account cognitive
elements of this nature. Thus, there seems to be scope for interesting future research,
in which we propose that experimental and theoretical work should go hand in hand.
Our inquiry may ultimately have raised more questions than it answered. We
are not very surprised. One cannot reasonably expect insight into the sociological or
psychological determinants of economic behavior to pop up according to very simple
patterns. More research is needed, and we hope that our study will serve as an
inspiration.
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FIGURE 1: Amounts donated for the whole sample (N=352)
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FIGURE 2: Treatment effects on means of donations (overall mean=275 kronor,
     N=352)
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FIGURE 3: Treatment effects on means of strictly positive donations (overall mean =
    360 kronor, N=269)
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FIGURE 4: Treatment effects on proportion of subjects who give nothing (overall
     proportion=24%, N=352)
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Appendix: Instructions (translated from Swedish)
{The text below was given to subjects in the treatments with on stage payment and a
female recipient. Substitute the words "man", "his" & "he" for "woman", "her" &
"she" throughout to get the wording for the treatments with a male recipient. The
underlined text was not given in the treatments with private payment. Moreover, the
instruction in these treatments contain the phrase "They can then both recieve their
money" rather than "She can then recieve her money".}
AN EXPERIMENT
Introduction
You are invited to take part in an experiment. You will determine a division of 1000
kronor between yourself and a randomly chosen woman who is also in the
introductory economics course this term. Participation in the experiment is voluntary.
You participate by filling out and handing in this form here and now.
All participants in the experiment have a chance of winning money. Using a lottery
and a code number (see below), we will select one participant in the experiment
during a lecture in the Aula Magna on March 1, 2000 at 11 a.m. This person's code
number and decision will be announced. If the person is present and steps up on stage
he/she will receive payment (minus tax) according to his/her decision. If the person
does not come on stage the chance to win money disappears, and we will select a new
person, etc. When a person has been selected in this manner, we will use a lottery
mechanism to select the randomly selected woman that is affected by the decision.
We will announce her code number. She can then recieve her money (minus tax) by
contacting us before 12 noon on March 30, 2000.
The task
Your task is thus to determine a division of 1000 kronor between yourself and a
randomly selected woman who is also a student in the introductory economics course
this term. The division must add upp to 1000 kronor for your answer to be valid. It is
important that you choose your decision without discussing it with anyone else in the
room. Make your decision by filling in the amounts below:
DIVISION:     ___________ kronor to myself,
                        ___________ kronor to the randomly selected woman
Your anwer will soon be collected. Your code number and answer will only be
announced if you are selected through the lottery as has been described above.
Otherwise, you will remain completely anonymous in relation to all other participants
in the experiment.
In order to pay you money we will need to know that the person receiving the money
really is the one selected in the lottery. Since the code number below is connected
with social security number and initials we can check your identification. Now fill in
your code number:
Your code number:__ __ __ __ (last 4 digits of the soc.sec.no.) __ __ (your initials)
When you have filled in all the information above, fold this form (once) and put it
before you on the desk.